Experts at Debate: The Use of Metaphor in the U.S. Senate Debate on the Gulf Crisis

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The U.S. Senate debate on the Gulf Crisis was examined with respect to metaphor usage. Metaphors were classified according to tenor and the metaphor user's position in the debate. Numerous differences were found with respect to both factors. It is argued that metaphor was used to state and/or simplify the premises of a senator's argument and was also used to induce a sharing of premises with an audience. Using international relations theory, metaphor use was interpreted in relation to the need to emphasize and reinforce an "ENEMY" image of Iraq, with an alternative being a possible "CHILD"—"IMPERIAL" image pattern to describe Iraqi-U.S. relations.

This study concerns the use of metaphor by individuals who are (presumably) expert in the domain of political rhetoric. The contents of the January 1991 U.S. Senatorial debate on the Gulf Crisis were examined, with the analysis focused on how metaphor was used in relation to political position and goals. In this context, senators are viewed as expert politicians and expert speakers, especially in relation to political rhetoric.

The debate was held in a politically charged context. In response to Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. troops were sent to Saudi Arabia as a defensive measure. Subsequently, however, an offensive posture was assumed. Additionally, the Bush administration, in conjunction with the United Nations Security Council, organized an international embargo against Iraq, in the hope that economic sanctions would force Hussein to withdraw the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Iraqi troops were not withdrawn, however, and via a United Nations resolution, Saddam Hussein was given until January 15 to withdraw.

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with military intervention authorized on or after that date. The United States Senate met on January 10, 11, and 12 to consider aspects of the possible military action, and two resolutions, the Mitchell–Nunn and the Dole–Warner, were debated. The former condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and advocated the continued use of sanctions to force Iraqi withdrawal. The latter, also condemning the invasion, authorized the use of force to produce withdrawal. Each senator was allowed to speak at least once, presenting his or her side of the issue. Although the Senate deliberations were termed a "debate," the vote, which was 52–47, was virtually a foregone conclusion, with supporters of the administration holding a small majority. The proceedings were broadcast nationally and received considerable public attention.

The study of metaphor has been of considerable interest in recent years (e.g., Black, 1962; Honeck & Hoffman, 1980; Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980; Ortony, 1979), and although the topic of political metaphor had for some time received little attention (Zashin & Chapman, 1974), it too has recently been the subject of growing interest. Metaphor, for example, has been studied in relation to gender and national security (Cohn, 1987), social policy (Schön, 1979), political discourse (Graesser, Mio, & Millis, 1988; Howe, 1988), and historical analogy (Neustadt & May, 1986). In addition, political metaphor has also been studied experimentally (e.g., Bosman, 1987; J. T. Johnson & Taylor, 1981), with Read, Cesa, Jones, and Collins (1990), for example, finding that using metaphor in a speech can produce a more positive evaluation of the speech's arguments, more positive views of the speaker, and a greater likelihood of attitude change. Furthermore, metaphor also can influence the nature of inferences made in relation to the speech.²

Our analysis of metaphor in the Gulf Crisis debate focused on three questions. First, how were metaphors used in relation to the position taken by a senator in the debate? We expected that senators favoring sanctions would be likely to use metaphors involving the positive aspects of sanction use and the negative aspects of war, whereas those senators subscribing to possible military intervention would use metaphors involving the need to stop Hussein and Iraq’s military aggression while using metaphors about sanctions to underscore the idea that sanctions were not working.

Second, what functions did metaphor serve in the debate? In this regard,

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¹There were other issues involved in the debate such as the question of whether the President was authorized to take military action without the consent of Congress. However, the major question of the debate was whether to have continued use of sanctions or to agree with the Bush administration in its expressed intention to use military force. What would have happened if a majority of senators had voted for continued use of sanctions is a problematic question, although the Congressional Record contains a statement indicating that President Bush felt he did not require congressional approval to take military action.

²A given senator's audience in the Gulf debate likely included not only senator colleagues, but other people in government, including those of the Bush administration, a senator's constituents, and the public at large.
metaphor has long been regarded as a rhetorical device that can facilitate persuasion. In the present case, however, hard data are not available regarding the extent to which metaphor use was effective. We do suggest, however, that metaphor in the Gulf Crisis debate had two general functions related to (a) argument justification and (b) the sharing of premises. With respect to the first, metaphor could be used as a reason supporting a claim or it could be used to simplify and/or emphasize a stated reason. For example, if a claim were made that Hussein's aggression had to be stopped because "Hussein is another Hitler," the metaphor serves as support for the claim. If the claim were supported by the reason Hussein is a ruthless dictator who will invade other countries if given the chance, then the metaphor "Hussein is another Hitler" would serve to clarify and emphasize the concept of Hussein as a ruthless aggressor by making the concept more familiar, concrete, and vivid.

With respect to the sharing of premises, in the attempt to persuade an audience, a critical need is for the speaker and the speaker's audience to share premises (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969). Thus, the "Hussein as Hitler" metaphor allows the speaker to assert, in effect, "You know what Hitler was like, and what Hussein has done and is capable of doing is at least as bad." If the audience agrees, then the speaker is more likely to be successful in persuading the audience that drastic measures should be taken regarding Hussein and that appeasement should not take place. Without the metaphor, the premise of Hussein's character and motives would likely have been more difficult to establish. Although data are not available to determine the extent to which various audience members actually felt that premises were shared, our data are consistent with the idea that the senators' metaphors suggested personalization, bringing the particular tenor into a familiar and sometimes everyday context, such as the repeated "dialing 911 for America if you are a country in trouble."

Third, later in this article, we examine metaphor use in conjunction with international relations theory, and ask: How did metaphor serve to indicate possible factors underlying the debate?

METHOD

The senators' statements were obtained from the Congressional Record of January 10, 11, and 12, 1991. The entire contents of the 3 days of the Senate Persian Gulf debate were examined for metaphor, which was defined broadly as any use of figurative language, including historical analogy. Instances of figurative language were categorized according to the topic or tenor of the metaphor and the position of the speaker. Metaphors judged as "dead" were

3Marschark, Katz, and Paivio (1983) presented results on the scaling of metaphors that indicate high intercorrelation of 10 metaphor scales including measures of comprehensibility, goodness, and imagery.
discarded. All senators spoke at least once except Cranston (D, CA) and Packwood (R, OR; party and state abbreviations are given in parentheses for each senator). Each speaker used metaphor at least once. Approximately 296,400 words of text were searched in which 756 metaphors were found. This amounts to .25 metaphors per 100 words of text, which is lower than the .56 per 100 words for John Kennedy and 1.20 per 100 words reported for Richard Nixon by Pollio, Barlow, Fine, and Pollio (1977).

The text of the 3 days of debate was divided among three coders. As a measure of intercoder reliability, each of the coders independently marked all instances of metaphor in a 15-page excerpt of the debate. Agreement was relatively high (80%), and any discrepancies were discussed until full agreement was reached.

RESULTS

Those senators who voted in support of the Bush administration’s position are termed “Republicans,” and those who voted for continued sanctions are termed “Democrats.” (In fact, 10 actual Democrats and 2 actual Republicans voted in opposition to this delineation.) Classification of the metaphors by tenor yielded eight topics that included approximately 90% of the coded metaphors. Table 1 presents the frequency of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall situation</td>
<td>85 (.38)</td>
<td>138 (.62)</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush/United States</td>
<td>63 (.44)</td>
<td>79 (.56)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bush alone)*</td>
<td>8 (.21)</td>
<td>30 (.79)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein/Iraq</td>
<td>84 (.64)</td>
<td>48 (.36)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>22 (.27)</td>
<td>58 (.73)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>16 (.21)</td>
<td>60 (.79)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>26 (.37)</td>
<td>45 (.63)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>5 (.28)</td>
<td>13 (.72)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>6 (.43)</td>
<td>8 (.57)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Metaphor usage (proportion of combined total) | .41 | .59 |
| Debate text                                             | .43 | .57 |

Note. Yes: for military intervention; No: for continued use of sanctions; for each topic, proportions of Yes and No metaphors are given in parentheses.

*This topic is a subset of Bush/United States and so is excluded from the metaphor total.
metaphor occurrence for each topic, as well as a breakdown of topic usage by position on the issue. The proportions at the bottom of Table 1 indicate that whereas Democrats stated more metaphors than Republicans, 59% to 41%, they also produced more text, 57% to 43%, thus indicating that the proportion of metaphor use per amount of text was approximately equivalent for the two sides. The proportions for each topic indicate that Republicans substantially exceeded their .43 proportion of the text only for metaphors about Hussein/Iraq whereas the Democrats substantially exceeded their proportion of .57 of the text for metaphors about President Bush, sanctions, war, and the Middle East.

In what follows, the data are described in terms of the vehicles employed in each of the respective eight topic areas, with examples provided of some of the more commonly used and more interesting metaphors. In general, a citation is given for a metaphor when the metaphor is a unique, longer statement and not when it is shorter or a relatively familiar phrase. (All page citations are to the Congressional Record, 1991.)

Overall Situation

**Spatial perspective.** Democrats characterized the position of Americans as "in a hole," "boxed in," "painted into a corner," "stampeded," or "like lemmings marching to the sea" (Kerry, D, MA, p. 251). Republicans, however, saw the situation as a "window of opportunity"—although one Democrat stated, in referring to the lack of attention given to the situation in the Baltic States, "We are looking out the wrong window."

**Path.** Democrats frequently referred to following a particular path to reach an acceptable conclusion; we should "stay the course" of sanctions. Kennedy (D, MA, p. 128) utilized a literary reference to path by quoting from Robert Frost's "The Road Not Taken." With one exception—Cohen (R, ME), who stated that "The path is dark and dangerous" (p. 167)—Republicans did not utilize a path metaphor.

**Movies.** Movies were mentioned with considerable frequency. Senator Kennedy termed the situation a "High Noon" atmosphere created by the President, with other Democrats referring to Cool Hand Luke ("What we have here is a failure to communicate"), a "John Wayne syndrome," Sylvester Stallone, and Dr. Strangelove. On the Republican side, mention was made of "High Noon" to convey the urgency of the situation. Similarly, there was an expressed need for good forces to triumph over evil, to "run the bad guys out of town," thus by implication portraying the United States as the "good guys."
Historical analogies. Historical analogies accounted for about one fourth of the tropes classified as overall-situation metaphors, being mentioned with about equal frequency by both sides. The same historical periods were often used to explicate opposite viewpoints. In referring to Vietnam, Republicans used expressions such as "Do not tie the hands of the soldiers behind their backs" (Mack, R, FL, p. 292). Democrats emphasized the death toll and the lack of popular support when they stated "no more Vietnam." The other frequently used historical analogy involved the events prior to and during World War II. Supporters spoke of appeasement and the Chamberlain–Hitler Munich meeting of 1938, frequently citing Churchill's comment: "This is only the first sip—the first foretaste of a bitter cup that will be offered to us year by year." Kuwait was also likened to Czechoslovakia and Abyssinia, and several senators warned of the coming "blitzkrieg" and "holocaust." Indeed, Senator Chaffe (R, RI) even asserted "this is 1934–1939" (p. 174). Democrats, on the other hand, attempted to refute these assertions. Senator Kennedy (D, MA) stated "Baghdad is not Munich. Kuwait is not Czechoslovakia" (p. 370). Senator Bradley (D, NJ) also referred to the pre-World War II situation, but used it to support sanctions:

"If Hitler's earliest aggression—against the Rhineland—or Japan's earliest aggression—against Manchuria—or Mussolini's earliest aggression—against Ethiopia—had been met with strong deterrent measures, including precautionary international military preparations and strong economic reprisals, the Allies might never have had to face the awful choice of war or appeasement. That's the lesson of the 1930's, and it is directly applicable to the Gulf." (p. 136)

Other historical situations were brought forward. One Republican (Cohen, R, ME, pp. 166–167), in arguing for the futility of sanctions, mentioned the chemical weapon facility in Libya, when "we sounded all the whistles and blew all the horns," yet supplies continued to be sold to the Libyans by "companies who smell profit even in a canister of poison." Senator Seymour (R, CA, p. 384) cited historical examples when sanctions failed, as sanctions on Fidel Castro for his funding of Communist movements. Senator Specter (R, PA) stated that waiting "will give Iraq's forces more time to build the greatest fortified work since the Maginot Line" (p. 143). The Middle East situation without American intervention was likened to a "dark age of conflict" (Rudman, R, NH, p. 325) or a "Brueghelian world of massive instability..." (Wallop, R, WY, p. 273). Senator Coats (R, IN) referred to war at a later date as a "Pyrrhic victory... if we saved the country and sacrificed the population" (p. 364).

Democrats used the U.S. Civil War and the Arab–Israeli wars in reference to potentially high casualty rates. Syria's invasion of Lebanon and the Soviet repression of the independence movements in the Baltic States were used as examples of situations in which the United States did not intervene, thereby
raising doubts about the consistency of American foreign policy. Senator Biden (D, DE) recalled prior Senatorial debates about waging a preventive war on the Soviet Union and China, and quoted Sakharov: “A preventive war is simply wrong in principle. We know too little about the laws of history. The future is unpredictable; we are not gods” (p. 340). Senator Moynihan (D, NY) presented his recollection of the Kuwaiti delegation to the United Nations as being “a particularly poisonous enemy of the United States” (p. 109). He also drew a parallel between current interventionist foreign policy and “the stuff of Roman legions.” Finally, Senator Byrd (D, WV, pp. 358–359) offered some lengthy synopses of battles fought by the ancient Romans to illustrate the wisdom of waiting patiently for the correct point in time to begin a war.

Bush/United States

Although the frequency of metaphorical reference to the United States’ role was relatively equal between parties, Democrats were about three times as vocal as Republicans in their metaphorical descriptions of President Bush, emphasizing a negative interpretation of his leadership. Democrats described Bush as “KING,” “We still elect our Presidents, we do not crown them” (Kerry, D, MA, p. 251); as “GAMBLER,” “He upped the stakes from a defensive to an offensive position,” “rolling the dice,” and “strengthen his hand”; and as “MAGICIAN,” “He plucked January 15th out of thin air,” and “None of us has a crystal ball” (Harkin, D, IA, p. 218). Another Democrat (Dixon, D, IL) said “The language of threat—just watch me or we’ll kick his ass—bore greater resemblance to a little league football coach than to a commander-in-chief” (p. 373). Democrats also referred to Bush as the “head of the world police.” Frequent mention was made of America as the emergency telephone number, 911—“Countries dial 911 and expect the United States to be there.” Similarly, the United States was seen as “Big Brother,” “our brother’s keeper,” and “the guardian of the world, leading it by the hand.”

Republicans mentioned that Bush “has gone the extra mile” and that he had worked miracles in bringing the coalition together. Republicans described Bush as “CAPTAIN”: “The captain cannot abandon the ship,” “President Bush has asked us all to get on board . . . for if we are not all on board at the time of takeoff, how can we expect to be on board for the landing?” (Stevens, R, AK, p. 263). President Bush was also viewed as “CONDUCTOR”: “Congress forgets that its job is to write the music and not to conduct the orchestra” (Murkowski, R, AK, p. 287).

Relating the Senate vote to the President, the Democrats considered an affirmative vote to be “handing a blank check of American lives to the President” (Metzenbaum, D, OH, p. 237). The Republicans suggested that a negative vote will physically incapacitate the President, “tying his hands behind his back,” “shackle the President,” “publicly hamstring the President,” and with
respect to the troops, "chops the knees out from under our boys." Both sides referred to Bush's military role. The Republicans stressed the need to "close ranks around the President" whereas the Democrats countered that they were being expected "to line up and salute."

The United States was seen by both sides as a prizefighter who had "drawn the line in the sand" for its opponent. Democrats viewed the United States Gulf role in terms of weight: "The United States is carrying the lion's share of the burden" and is "forced to carry the load for the rest of the world."

Democrats who crossed party lines to support the use of military force utilized a metaphor not used by actual Republicans, as "the torch of liberty within our grasp, standing for freedom and liberty throughout the world" (Lieberman, D, CT, p. 239), "Let us not sell out the freedom of men for the pottage of false peace" (Lieberman, p. 239), and the need for nonisolationism, "We must live as men and not ostriches, nor dogs in the manger" (Breaux, D, LA, p. 234).

Hussein/Iraq

Republicans used about twice as many metaphors as Democrats when referring to Saddam Hussein, the only category in which Republican usage was greater. Republicans emphasized to a greater extent than the Democrats the violent and unpredictable characteristics they perceived in Hussein. Virtually all speakers chose to use the name Saddam Hussein as a metonymic substitute for Iraq or for some contextually appropriate attribute of Iraq, such as its government or military forces.

Both sides referred to a "Saddam Hussein machine." Hussein was seen as a violent criminal: Both sides called him a "rapist," "thief," and "villain"; Republicans added "robber," "plunderer," "murderer," "cuthroat," "blackmailer," and "thug." Senator Durenberger (R, MN) used a movie to describe Hussein:

"It has been reported that Saddam Hussein's favorite movie is 'The Godfather.' I can understand that, Mr. President. Like the fictitious Don, who knelt before the church altar blessing himself while his gunmen slew dozens of his enemies, so too does Saddam mouth the sacred words of Islam while his soldiers destroy the lives of any who would oppose him in the Gulf." (p. 311)

Noncriminal professions that Hussein was said to practice included: "butcher" (both sides), and for the Democrats, "gambler," "chess player," and "actor."

Several psychological disorders were attributed to Hussein. Both sides called him a "fanatic." Republicans also used the terms "madman," "power addict," and "egomaniac," whereas Democrats used "megalomaniac." Both sides labeled Hussein a glutton, but Senator D'Amato (R, NY) articulated this theme best:
“Saddam Hussein is like a glutton—a geopolitical glutton. He is sitting down at a big banquet table, overflowing with goodies. And let me tell you—like every glutton, he is going to have them all. Kuwait is just the appetizer—He is gobbling it up—but it is not going to satisfy him. After a noisy belch or two, he is going to reach across the table for the next morsel. What is it going to be? Saudi Arabia? . . . He is going to keep grabbing and gobbling. . . . It is time to let this grisly glutton know the free lunch is over. It is time for him to pay the bill.” (p. 384)

Hussein was also compared to animals, diseases, and other leaders. Both sides referred to him as a snake (“defang Hussein”) and also used dog imagery, but again Republicans extended the list with crocodile, tiger, and bird-of-prey, as well as the mythical hydra. Republicans called him “garbage,” and “a virus,” or a “cancer cell,” and a Democrat referred to him as “fester ing menace.” Finally, several historical figures were compared to Hussein. On both sides, comparisons to Stalin and Hitler occurred, and Republicans also called him a new “Nebuchadnezzar” and “Nasser.”

War

Differences between positions were found with respect to conceptions of the nature of a possible war, its purpose, and its repercussions. Overall, Democrats introduced about four times as many metaphors of war as the Republicans did. Democrats regarded war as an unpredictable sequence of events that should commence only after other tools have failed, whereas Republicans ascribed unpredictability to Hussein. Both Republicans and Democrats used similar monetary metaphors for war, calling the death of soldiers “paying the price,” the “spending of American lives,” “financial sacrifice,” “a wholesale loss,” and the “cost in blood.” Democrats emphasized the loss of life that they thought would result from immediate aggression on Iraq, but Republicans argued that there would be a “bigger bill in blood later” (if the President were not given the authority to take action now).

Howe (1988) examined the distinction between rule-bound and chaotic war metaphors; in the present context, Republicans tended to use the former whereas Democrats tended toward the latter. As examples, Republicans compared war to a business and a chess game: “men and women as political pawns in the desert” (Craig, R, ID, p. 400), with sanctions producing a “stalemate.” In contrast, Democrats made appeals to the unpredictability of war. War is “a mess,” “mayhem,” “a nightmare,” “an unpredictable tiger ride,” “unleashing a mad Middle East genie from its bottle,” “not the Super Bowl,” “not an Easter-egg Hunt,” and “a black abyss.” The Republicans’ only similar remark was that war will make “Saddam Hussein stare into the abyss of certain defeat” (D’Amato, R, NY, p. 384), thus ascribing the unpredictability of war to Hussein’s side. Democrats further suggested that war should be viewed as “an
instrument, and not an end in itself.”” or in a similar respect, as a weapon, “an arrow that should not be pulled from the quiver too soon” (Dodd, D, CT, p. 270) or “the barrel of a gun” through which we impose our culture (Hollings, D, SC, p. 329), a comment to which we return later in this article. Finally, the Democrats considered the repercussions of a possible war in terms of natural disasters: “a volcanic explosion of terrorism” (Levin, D, MI, p. 303), “a never ending wave of Islamic fundamentalism” (Leahy, D, VT, p. 362), “a tidal wave of anti-Americanism” (Hatfield, R, OR, p. 375), and “an avalanche of fundamentalism” (Levin, p. 304).

Sanctions

Democrats stated approximately three times as many metaphors as Republicans about sanctions. The Democrats focused on actions and effects of the sanctions, whereas Republicans emphasized their potential failure. Democrats referred to the embargo as “airtight” or “hermetically sealed.” Sanctions were said to be “biting heavily” or “corrosive.” Many statements expressed the Iraqi economy as a living thing, with sanctions “inflicting pain,” “squeezing,” and “pinching.” The sanctions were “bleeding his country dry,” “crippling his country,” making the country “a basket case,” “choking” and “strangling” with an “ever-tightening noose.” Sanctions were a weight under which the economy “crumbles” or “is grinding to a halt,” or a burden that will “break Saddam Hussein’s back.” Sanctions were heat, as in “Iraq is feeling the heat,” “reserves have evaporated,” and “supplies that have dried up.” And, sanctions were humiliating, forcing the country “on its knees” and “to cannibalize itself.”

On the other hand, Republicans viewed sanctions as a leaky pipe or dam (“There are already leaks, and soon it will become a flood,” “The longer they stand, the more porous they become”) and as a thing with holes (the sanctions “will look more and more like Swiss cheese”). The Republicans also viewed sanctions as an asset for Saddam Hussein—“a free pass, a recess, a winter vacation,” “a free ride,” “a fig leaf”—or merely as a delay, “the postponement of a violent storm.” In two cases, Republicans referred to the effectiveness of the blockade, but indicated that its effects were not on the denied object: “Turkey loses money by leaving the spigot shut on Iraq oil” (Specter, R, PA, p. 392), “The economic noose is a ring of iron around the neck of the Iraqi people” (Heinz, R, PA, p. 312).

The sanction resolution was described by both sides as a prescription. Whereas one Democrat (Kerrey, D, NE) viewed the resolution for continued sanctions as a “prescription for success” (p. 267), one Republican (Gorton, R, WA) held that it was a “prescription for defeat . . . for more terrorism, for the death and expulsion . . . of more people” (p. 145).
The United Nations Coalition

Twenty-nine nations participated in the military effort opposing Iraq in the Middle East. Republicans described the coalition in terms of a "family of nations," with brotherhood and friendship, "joining hands and getting together and doing what has to be done" (Hatch, R, UT, p. 144). Republicans most often used metaphor to describe the coalition's perceived fragility resulting from a prolonged use of sanctions. The coalition was a structure that might "crack," "fracture," "collapse," "disintegrate," or "crumble." Others viewed it as something that might "melt" or might "drift" from its position.

Democrats used some similar metaphors but focused on difficulties the coalition would face in the event of war. They also stated that it would "crumble" or "fracture," and one Senator (Hatfield, R, OR, p. 375) feared it would be "torn apart by the shifting sands of the Middle East." Democrats referred to the governmental leaders that formed the coalition as the "court of world opinion." Senator Kennedy (D, MA, p. 370) voiced dissatisfaction with the "good cop–bad cop" roles taken by the allies and the United States, respectively, and criticized the French peace initiative by stating, "The United States beats the drums of war while other nations hold forth the olive branch." Other Democrats asserted that our allies were "coat holders" or "cheerleaders," happy to let the U.S. military do the fighting, while some members of the coalition were described as "shadow battlefield allies," or "bizarre bedfellows" that "must be roped in" to keep them from straying.

The Middle East

Republicans regarded the Middle East as an area of territorial conflict, and Democrats regarded it as an unpredictable danger zone. One Republican (Graham, D, FL) called the Middle East "a parking lot for military weapons of the world" (p. 285), and another (Cohen, R, ME) referred to the cutthroat nature of the region in "the Syrian and Iranian wolves that are waiting at Iraq's door" (p. 168). He then related the Middle East to a vortex, "a wheel of conflict, . . . pulling us into its orbit."

Democratic imagery was aligned along the theme of puzzling unpredictability, the Middle East was seen as "labyrinthine and treacherous," "a bomb that may explode in war," "the Rubik's cube of the world" (Dodd, D, CT, p. 395), "a cauldron of conflict," "a mess," "the most volatile region of the world," a "vacuum" or "power vacuum," and a wheel of fortune, as in "turn the wheel of Persian Gulf instability one more time" (Harkin, D, IA, p. 220).
Oil

Both sides made reference to the role of oil. Republicans called it "the lifeblood," "oxygen," "as basic to the economy as water is to life," and "the raw material of human endeavor." But, in addition, Cohen (R, ME, p. 166), in referring to American Middle Eastern policy, indicated "We are paying the wages of past sins." Oil was also seen as addictive ("There are other nations that are addicted to oil") and something from which we must "wean" ourselves. Further, oil was seen as Hussein's "weapon" and "the fuel for his Imperial dream." In turn, Democrats called oil "the backbone of Iraqi economy" and "fuel for our economy," but also indicated that oil is plentiful ("The world is awash in oil") and not worth the loss of lives ("No blood for oil").

DISCUSSION

Metaphor Use

With respect to the first facet of our analysis, the data indicate that metaphor was applied to many aspects of the crisis (i.e., the tenors were quite varied), with use varying as a function of political position. The findings thus support the idea that experts in political rhetoric, assuming senators are such, employ metaphor extensively in their oratory.

With respect to the various functions of metaphor, data, of course, are not available to determine how persuasive the metaphors were or to gauge the extent to which they evoked images, associations, and/or affect. However, the data do indicate that, as previously described, metaphors were used as reasons to support claims or as restatements of supporting reasons, with such restatements presumably simplifying, emphasizing, concretizing, and/or personalizing a particular issue. Senator Biden (D, DE, p. 119), for example, provided an allegory in reference to those who criticized a vote against the administration resolution. Biden referred to the story of a jewel thief escaping out a building with jewels and being told by a person on the seventh floor that if he (the thief) did not stop, he, the man on the seventh floor, would jump on him. Biden pointed out that you may get the jewels back but the costs would not be worth it. This allegory thus served as the supporting reason, essentially saying that the costs of freeing Kuwait may be too great.

Kennedy (D, MA) used the "High Noon" metaphor to emphasize the role of the United States in relation to the coalition: "But since November 8, because of the 'High Noon' atmosphere created by President Bush, the conflict has been becoming increasingly America against Iraq—and if the shooting starts, it will be almost entirely America against Iraq" (p. 126). The projected solo role of
the United States continues the "High Noon" metaphor. Kennedy's reason in this case for opposing military action was that the United States would be fighting the war essentially by itself and that this situation, with its urgency, was created by the President. The metaphor restated this reason in concrete terms.

Senator Johnson (R, LA, p. 189), after stating the question "Do we vote yes or no on the power [to the President] to go to war?" indicated that he answered the question yes (claim) because "then the better chance we have to avoid the war" (supporting reason). But he also argued that Hussein hoped that Congress will tell the President he does not have that power, and therefore the vote to limit the President is important to Hussein—"The last card he [Hussein] has to play is the Congress of the United States." Thus, in a complex argument, Senator Johnson used the card-playing metaphor as support for the claim that a "no" vote supported Hussein's position.

An interesting finding was that the same vehicle, such as "High Noon," was used by different speakers to support different claims. The Democrats used "High Noon" to suggest that President Bush created the crisis atmosphere whereas the Republicans used it as a "good over evil" metaphor. Similarly, although Senator Mack (R, FL) indicated that "soldiers' hands should not be tied" as in Vietnam, Senator Kerrey (D, NE, p. 374) used Vietnam to illustrate the failure of the American people to support a war that does not end quickly and has a negative effect on the economic, cultural, and political life of the region.

We turn now to how metaphor was used in relation to the underlying policies and perceptions embraced by each side. We argue that the metaphors used by the Republicans were employed with at least two related goals in mind: (a) to provide and encourage support of President Bush and his policies and (b) to strengthen and reinforce an enemy image of Iraq. With respect to the former, the Republican metaphors about the President, about the general situation, and about the coalition suggest that the Republicans wanted to provide strong support for their party leader. For them, a vote authorizing the use of force (as in Johnson's, R, LA, argument just cited) not only provided support of the President's projected military action but also involved the idea that the threat of war was the best way to peace. But if Hussein did not comply, then they felt military action would be necessary and justifiable. This brings us to the second goal, namely, that for military action to be justifiable, it is important that one is fighting an enemy. Iraq, however, until shortly before the Gulf Crisis, had been supported by the United States; furthermore, Iraq's attack was on Kuwait and not on the United States. Therefore, given these and other factors, it was important to strengthen and reinforce the image of Iraq as an enemy, and metaphor was a means to do this.
Metaphor Use and International Relations Theory

The concept of an enemy has been considered theoretically by Cottam (1977) and Herrmann (1984, 1988). The theory describes images that individuals of one country may have of other countries, images such as “ENEMY,” “ALLY,” “DEGENERATE,” “IMPERIAL,” “CHILD,” and others. In the theory, an image is based on three factors. First and foremost is whether individuals in Country A, for example, perceive Country B as a threat or an opportunity. In the case of an enemy, there is, of course, a perception of threat. The other two factors providing the basis of an image are Country A’s (the leaders’) perception of Country B’s capability (military, economic, etc.) and Country A’s perception of Country B’s culture (i.e., whether Country B’s culture is regarded as superior, equivalent, or inferior to that of Country A). For the “ENEMY” image, Country A, according to the model, would perceive Country B as having a capability and a culture approximately equal to its own.

The model further postulates that to determine how, for example, leaders of Country A perceive Country B, one should use three indicators: namely, what leaders of Country A state about Country B’s motivation, Country B’s capability, and Country B’s (governmental) decision process. When Country A perceives Country B as “ENEMY,” it will, according to the model, refer to B’s motivation as aggressive, ruthless, and expansionistic, even desiring world domination. In addition, the leader(s) of Country B are regarded as highly rational and clever in obtaining their goals. Country B’s capability will be perceived as being approximately equal to that of Country A, although Country B is also usually regarded by Country A to be a “paper tiger” that will back down when confronted. Country B’s decision process will be said by Country A to be monolithic, that is, a government controlled by one or a few individuals. Dissent is said not to be tolerated, and the people of Country B are viewed as suppressed and not involved in the decision process.

Returning now to the Gulf Crisis debate, the metaphors used by the Republicans enhanced and reinforced the perception of Iraq as an enemy because, by and large, the metaphors portrayed Iraq as a serious threat, with the motivation, capability, and decision process characteristic of an enemy. Roth (R, DE) stated, “His [Hussein’s] intentions are clear—intentions that pose a direct threat not only to the security of our country but to the world at large” (p. 137). Cohen (R, ME) asserted:

“Whether he acquires them [nuclear weapons] in six months or six years he will have them and an international range for his ballistic missiles; and that means that the wheatfields of Kansas will fall under the same threat as the oil fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.” (p. 167)

Thus, Iraq, or perhaps more properly, Hussein, is spoken of as a direct threat to the United States and the world at large, reinforcing the “ENEMY” image.
with respect to motivation and capability. Similarly, Hussein's motivation is also clearly and frequently described as highly aggressive (a "glutton" for territory) and ruthless, and with respect to capability, Hatch (R, UT, p. 386), in speaking of Hussein's "weapons of mass destruction," stated "He has already killed thousands with chemical weapons . . . and has almost certainly developed deliverable biological weapons. . . . Hussein's well-advanced nuclear weapons program could develop a crude device within a few months." Finally, Hussein's governmental decision processes are clearly perceived as monolithic, a "godfather" who killed his own people via gas.

But what was the Democrats' view? To consider this we must first discuss what the Cottam–Herrmann model calls a "complex" image. The "ENEMY" image, as other images, can vary along a continuum, with one end being the extreme image stereotype having the previously described characteristics and the other end being complex, an image in which little is perceived in the way of threat or opportunity. An "ENEMY" image can thus vary in magnitude along the continuum and, for it to be the extreme stereotypic version, the threat must be perceived as serious. Given this continuum, the Democrats apparently had an image of Iraq that was more complex than that of the Republicans. The metaphor account indicates that with respect to motivation, Democrats also viewed Hussein as highly aggressive, but, as indicated by the differences in Hussein-related metaphors, their expression was not as strong as that of the Republicans. Furthermore, consistent with this Republican–Democrat difference, the Dole–Warner resolution included the expression that Iraq is a "threat to world peace" whereas the Mitchell–Nunn resolution did not contain such a statement. With respect to capability, Republicans put a much stronger emphasis on a nuclear threat and possible use of poison gas whereas Democrats did not emphasize military factors, instead making greater mention of an economic threat. With respect to decision process, Democrats and Republicans both considered Iraq as monolithic, but Democrats used fewer metaphors than the Republicans regarding Hussein's ruthlessness. However, no one postulated that Hussein was highly rational and clever, as expected by the model.

Why should there be the difference in the perspectives of the Republicans and Democrats? As noted, a country is perceived in terms of the extreme enemy stereotype only when there is an extreme threat, and, as Senator Biden (D, DE) argued, Iraq did not, in his opinion, pose a real threat to the vital interests of the United States. Given this question about the magnitude of the threat, it was incumbent on Republicans, supporting the Bush offensive policy, to emphasize the threat; this was done by augmenting the enemy characteristics of Hussein's motivation, capability, and decision process. In other words, Iraq had to be shown to be posing a serious threat to the United States to justify the massive U.S. military buildup.

There is, however, an alternative image that merits consideration. If Iraq
is not viewed as posing a major direct threat to the United States, as Senator Biden (D, DE) argued, and if Iraq is perceived to have less capability than the United States, which certainly was the case, and if Iraq is perceived as culturally inferior to the United States, as suggested by the Hollings (D, SC) quote involving "forcing our culture" on Iraq, then the image that Americans would have of Iraq, according to the model (Herrmann, 1984), is that of a "CHILD"—in this case, a "child" who needs a lesson. Furthermore, and equally important, if this image is held, then according to the model, the image of the United States is that of an "IMPERIAL" power.

The possibility of the "CHILD"—"IMPERIAL" image pattern requires a few other theoretical considerations. One is that the "CHILD"—"IMPERIAL" image may be shown to apply more readily if an individual's perspective of the Gulf Crisis includes the Middle East as a whole rather than only the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the model, a "child" is viewed as an opportunity and not a threat, and, from a U.S. perspective, the Middle East is indeed an opportunity. In addition, a "child's" decision process involves two groups vying for country leadership—one, the "enlightened" group, being supporters of the imperial power, and the other, the "agitators" or "radicals" being opposed to that imperial power and those in government. Indeed, the "agitators" are sometimes regarded as being supported by another power. In the Gulf as a whole, there were several "enlightened" countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan (although Jordan lost favor in the war because of its failure to align itself with the coalition); in the coalition, although Syria was previously an "agitator" supported by the Soviet Union, it too joined the coalition. Iraq, however, was a Middle East "agitator," a threat to the "enlightened" countries.

The "CHILD"—"IMPERIAL" image interpretation is consistent with the metaphors used by some of the senators. Roth (R, DE, p. 138) spoke of essentially making an example of Hussein to demonstrate to the "Saddam Husseins" that in "the court of world opinion force and aggression are no substitutes for cooperation and diplomacy." Cohen (R, ME) spoke of the United States previously slapping Hussein on the wrists and saying, "Do not do it again," and he added, "Apparently we thought we should engage in a behavior modification program . . . " (p. 166). In addition, the statement by Senator Hollings that the United States is "using the barrel of a gun to force our culture on Iraq" (p. 329) supports perceived cultural differences, and with respect to capability, Cohen (R, ME) stated "... we now have the capability of obliterating Iraq" (p. 167), suggesting a large discrepancy in military power. With respect to economic capability, Senator Bentsen (D, TX) minimized Iraq's capability by stating, "What we are looking at here is a country that is about the geographical size of California, has the population of Texas, and has the income of Louisiana" (p. 224). Thus, metaphor use does suggest that the United States was viewing Iraq as an "imperial" power views a stubborn
"child," the "child" in this case being an "agitator" that is a threat to surrounding countries but part of an overall opportunity.

In conclusion, metaphor was used by the political experts with considerable frequency in the Gulf Crisis debate, the specific metaphors used varying with political position. Our analysis suggested some functions that metaphor served in this context, primarily as related to argumentation. The analyses further suggested how, when taken in conjunction with international relations theory, metaphor could be employed to study political issues fundamental to the debate.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was sponsored by the Mellon Foundation via an award made to the Learning Research and Development Center of the University of Pittsburgh. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily supported by that foundation.

We thank Drs. Richard Cottam, Richard Herrmann, and Brian Ripley for their helpful comments.

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